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ABSTRACT ABSTRACT ABSTRACT ABSTRACT       
We  discuss  issues  of  real  estate  price  bubble,  the  extent  of  wealth  effects, 
affordability, financial deepening and credit market risks. Our simulations indicate 
that given current wealth levels, cost of credit and maturity, average homes are not 
affordable by average consumers. The market requires further reduction in the cost of 
credit and extension of maturity to manage a significant demand shift in the real 
estate  market.  We  present  evidence  that  Turkey’s  credit  markets  are  shallow  to 
result in a banking crisis emerging from real estate credits. Finally, we document 
evidence in favor of the presence of wealth effects on consumption.       
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1. Introduction 1. Introduction 1. Introduction 1. Introduction       
 
"To have a roof to live under" 
 
Recent  data  on  credit  growth  and  increase  in  real  estate  prices  in  Turkey  raise 
concerns towards pricing of assets beyond their “normal” market values. Abnormal 
returns on asset prices — especially in the real estate market — have also been heavily 
discussed in many developed economies. And recently, the term “real estate price 
bubble”  has  received  stronger  attention.
4  Especially  for  emerging  economies, 
macroeconomic stability and induced capital flows — due to global excess liquidity — 
led to an increase in the supply of funds and therefore lowered the cost of financing. 
The immediate impact was observed in consumer credits and credits for real estate 
purchases. With a reduction in the cost of financing, the demand for house ownership 
increased and higher real estate prices are observed — partly due to inelastic supply of 
houses.  
 
Investment  in  the  Turkish  real  estate  market  has  gained  pace  in  the  1990s  and 
accelerated further right after the 2001 financial crisis. The increase in the growth 
rate of the economy, along with declining interest rates motivated the investment in 
real estate market. The prospects for European Union (EU) accession coupled with 
increased  capital  flows  also  increased  the  supply  of  funds.  Optimistic  scenarios 
brought along the severe banking competition in lending excess funds to real estate. 
Currently, bank competition is aggressive in the financing of housing purchases, so 
aggressive that especially in the short — run banks can offer lower rates for real estate 
                                                
4 We observe a similar trend in most developed economies (OECD, IMF).    3
credits,  although  at  some  times  this  return  is  lower  than  the  cost  of  acquiring 
deposits.  This  in  turn  leads  to  a  maturity  mismatch  between  the  assets  and  the 
liabilities of the banks’ balance sheets. Since the lending is for longer term, with an 
expected decline in interest rates, bank’s can write off profits in the medium-term. 
However, this is conditional on the inability to refinance the high cost of credit with 
the low cost one.
5 On the other hand, if the banking sector were financing real estate 
purchases  through  foreign  credit  then  we  would  observe  currency  mismatch  since 
most  real  estate  credits  are  in  domestic  currency.  If  maturity  and  currency 
mismatches are not well governed a small financial turmoil may lead to devastating 
results in both the housing market and the financial sector. 
 
The  increased  demand  in  the  real  estate  market  resulted  in  capital  gains  in 
investment  for  real  estate.  In  this  environment,  households  observe  two  effects 
depending on whether they are owners of real estate or planning to acquire one. In 
the former group, the rise in the asset prices along with the decline in the interest 
rates  lead  to  the  so  called  “wealth  effect”.  A  positive  shock  to  households’  total 
wealth leads to an increase in their current and future consumption.
6 In the second 
group, where households are on the buyer side of the market, there are both income 
and substitution effects. The decline in interest rates generates an income effect that 
motivates households to purchase houses whereas the increase in house prices leads 
                                                
5 There is no institutional framework other than taxes to deter the borrowers to substitute away from high cost 
credits; however recent – February 2006 – tax regulation removed tax barriers in the refinancing of housing 
credits.  
6 If this shock was observed in the financial wealth the impact is not as strong on the level and pattern 
of consumption. The main difference lies in the volatility of financial and non-financial assets. The 
latter is less volatile and changes in the level of non-financial assets are recognized as permanent.   4




It is important for a policy maker to observe how the increase in wealth is translated 
into an increase in consumption (increased demand). The immediate answer lies in 
the  sophistication  of  the  financial  markets  that  allows  households  to  utilize 
refinancing  of  their  mortgage.  With  decline  in  interest  rates  and  increase  in  real 
estate prices, households can substitute away from high to low cost financing and 
realize  the  capital  gain.  However, households  do  not have  to realize the  gains  to 
actually observe the wealth effect. Expectation for an increase in the lifetime wealth 
also motivates higher consumption. 
 
All these links have not been explored for Turkey, in this respect; this study will shed 
light onto the spoken but formally untouched issues. To motivate this we will answer 
three important questions on Turkish real estate market. First, do we observe a real 
estate price bubble in Turkey? Second, what would be the implications of real estate 
credit expansion on credit risks? And third, to what extent we observe wealth effects 
derived from real estate price increases? A formal answer to these questions will allow 
policy  makers  to  device  policies  on  financial  deepening,  demand  and  expectations 
management.  
 
Our answer to the first question is that real estate prices have recently picked up to 
the pre — 2001 crisis levels. Given that Turkey experienced 16 quarters of magnificent 
economic growth, this pick up is not substantial. For second question recent data 
                                                
7 There may be some behavioral dynamics inherent in the demand for real estate. In countries like 
Turkey, households prefer the ownership of a house than renting one.   5
addresses that there is no slowdown in the rate of increase of real estate credits — 
around 350 percent on an annual basis. This number could alarm many, however, the 
share of real estate credits in GDP is only 2.5 percent. Given that these credits are 
backed by real estate and diversified among a large number of consumers, risks can 
be managed to an extent in the banking sector. As for the last question, our results 
indicate that, there is a positive association between the household real estate wealth 
and  consumption  —  a  one  percent  increase  in  real  estate  wealth  results  in  a  0.2 
percent  increase  in  total  consumption.  These  answers  present  evidence  that 
developments in the real estate market have not been alarming yet, but there are 
indications for problems in the medium term.  
 
The next section presents the relevant literature for Real Estate Price Increases and 
Bubbles,  which  is  followed  by  section  3  with  an  analysis  of  real  estate  prices  in 
Ankara  and  tries  to  answer  the  question  of  a  presence  of  real  estate  bubble  in 
Turkey. In Section 4 an analysis of bank credits and affordability of real estate is 
discussed and in section 5 the presence of wealth effects is addressed. Eventually, 
section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Real Estate Price Increases and Bubbles 
 
A real estate bubble or housing bubble for residential markets is a type of economic 
bubble seen as rising house prices. Real estate bubbles occur periodically in local or 
global  real  estate  markets.  Whether  real  estate  price  bubble  busts  cause  banking 
crises is ambiguous but a high correlation is found between real estate price bubble 
busts in developing and industrialized countries and banking crises in those countries   6
(Erdonmez,  2005).  Examples  of  such  financial  crises  are  Tulipmania  in  Holland; 
South  Sea  Bubble  in  England;  Mississippi  Boom  in  France,  and  1929  Great 
Depression in the United States. More recently, Japan (1990s), Norway, Finland and 
Sweden (1980s and 1990s), and in developing countries: Argentine, Chili, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand have experienced such crises.  
 
Three phases are observed for real estate price bubbles. The first phase of an active 
real estate price bubble is the credit growth in a country, which increases housing 
prices for years. The second phase is the bubble crash, which can last for a few days, 
few months, or a longer period of time. In the third phase, firms and institutions that 
purchased the assets at higher prices go bankrupt. Following the third phase, banking 
and exchange rate crises are observed in the economy, which are disruptive for the 
real sector.  
 
Hebling and Terrones  (2003) calculate that housing price bubbles last five years on 
average and cause approximately eight percent of GDP loss. These bubbles have a 
greater  negative  effect  on  consumption  and  banking  system  than  equity  price 
bubbles.  Moreover,  housing  price  busts  have  adverse  effects  on  the  capacity  and 
willingness of the banking system to lend. This eventually causes a decline in private 
investment.  Terrones  (2004)  argues  that  Global  house  price  boom  in  industrial 
countries cannot be solely due to low interest rates. In Australia, Ireland, Spain and 
the United Kingdom, housing affordability ratios have also reached record-high levels 
and house prices across countries are highly synchronized.  
   7
Poterba (1991) provides three explanations for house price movements in the past 
three  decades:  changes in construction costs; changes in the real after-tax cost of 
ownership; and changes in demographic factors. His framework for explaining house 
price movements considers both the existing houses and the flow of constructions. In 
terms of the land costs, he finds that a surprisingly small fraction of the changes in 
house prices may be explained by changing land costs. In terms of the demographics, 
Poterba  suggests  that  the  rise  in  house  prices in the  late  1970s, might  partly  be 
explained  by  the  individuals,  between  the  ages  of  20-34,  increasing  their  housing 
consumption to start a family.  
 
3. Real Estate Prices In Turkey, Bubble? 3. Real Estate Prices In Turkey, Bubble? 3. Real Estate Prices In Turkey, Bubble? 3. Real Estate Prices In Turkey, Bubble?       
 
The  significant  recovery  after  the  2001  financial  crisis  with  an  IMF  based 
stabilization program and political stability changed the macroeconomic agenda of 
Turkey from high to low inflation, unstable to stable and high growth and a period of 
significant reforms towards more sound institutions.
8 8 8 8 Nominal interest rates in this 
period fell significantly, which opened up the possibilities for Banks to shift their 
portfolio  allocations  from  funding  public  sector  to  extending  credit  for  private 
investment. During the 2002 - 2005 period, the share of Treasury bonds on banks’ 
balance sheet is significantly reduced and the share of consumer and producer credits 
increased (Graph 1), (Table 1)
9 9 9 9.  
 
                                                
8 Turkey grew by 7 percent on average; inflation fell from 47 percent on average in 2002 to below 8 
percent by the end of 2005. Risk premium fell from 16 to 8 percent ex-post.  
9 Public banks after the crisis were re-capitalized with Treasury papers, therefore consolidated balance 
sheets of the banking sector may seem to present evidence against our argument, however, excluding 
this restructuring we still observe the portfolio shifts of the private banks balance sheets.   8
Lower  nominal  interest  rates  created  an  illusion  for  reduced  costs  of  financing 
therefore increased the demand for credits. Moreover, banks competing in the credit 
market reduced rates even further to take advantage of the “first mover” and still 
enjoyed high real returns. In the meantime, the deposits, real estate credits and total 
credits grew (Table 1, Table 2). The increased demand for real estate also boosted 




To  cross  check  this  argument  we  gathered  real  estate  price  and  rent  data  from 
TURYAP, the largest real estate broker in Turkey, for Ankara. The figures are the 
ask  prices  of  houses  on  the  market.
11  It  is  an  unbalanced  panel  with  an  annual 
frequency  for  the  2000  —  2005 period  collected  from 30 to 37 districts of Ankara 
(Table 3). The annual figures are for January of the corresponding year. Starting from 
the year 2005 we have monthly figures covering the first six months of the year. 
August 1999 earthquake significantly depressed real estate prices in Istanbul, however 
we observe that, across regions, prices in Ankara were relatively stable during and 
after the earthquake therefore has a good representation of average real estate price 
level in Turkey. From the Table we also observe that the financial crisis in the year 
2001 leveled out most of assets’ returns.  
 
Immediately after the 1999 earthquake, an average home in Ankara was priced at 
39,652  YTL  with  a  one  standard  deviation  of  16,605  YTL.  The  same  home  was 
rented for 2,868 YTL per year, by June 2005 the sale prices on average increased to 
                                                
10 There still remains the question whether the houses on the market are sold at the ask price — the 
price that most analysts take as the reference point. 
11 These are three bedroom apartments facing the street with furnace. There is a separation between new and old 
houses as well as luxurious and simple.   9
129,231  YTL  and  the  associated  pick  up  in  rents  was  7,128  YTL  per  year. This 
addresses a 186.3 percent increase in real estate prices in nominal terms, despite in 
real terms represents a 14.8 percent decline (TABLE 4). One can argue that as a 
result of the financial crisis there was a large correction in the exchange rates. In our 
data set some of the houses that we considered were on the market with a price tag 
in US dollars. On Table 5, we redid all the analysis in US dollars and kept the real 
estate sold in US dollars as is.
12 We observe that, in the same period, there is a 20 
percent increase in real estate prices.
13 Still a 20 percent increase lagged behind an 
economy that grew 8 percent on average in the last four years. 
 
We  observe  a  more  dramatic  decline  in  the  rent  prices  in  real  terms  with  35.1 
percent.  The  percussions  of  the  crisis  reflected  in  liquidation  of  real  estate.  The 
increase in the supply of housing depressed prices and rents asymmetrically, where 
the decline in the latter was more pronounced than the former. We believe that this 
is a result of fixed costs associated with keeping a house empty. Most housing in 
Turkey  are  apartment  buildings,  which  require  tenants/owners  to  pay  a  monthly 
maintenance fee i.e. doorkeeper fees, fuel for heating, garden maintenance, apartment 
maintenance etc. Especially, the fee is larger in the winter due to greater use of fuel 
or natural gas to heat up the unit.
14 Owners are required to pay the fees, when houses 
are not rented. This puts a downward pressure on rent prices. So it is not surprising 
to see decreasing rents when prices of houses for sale are growing.
15  
       
                                                
12 We used the end of the period Turkish Lira / US dollar exchange rate to covert real estate priced in Turkish 
Lira. 
13 In this period Turkish Lira appreciated against the US dollars (in nominal terms). 
14 The main reason the cost of keeping and maintaining a house is growing with rising energy prices. 
15 Of course this statement is true for houses that are kept for investment purposes.   10
In order to identify bubbles (before they burst), economists have developed a number 
of  financial  ratios  and  economic  indicators  that  can  be  used  to  evaluate  whether 
homes  in  a  given  area  are  fairly  valued  or  not.  Price  to  rent  ratio Price  to  rent  ratio Price  to  rent  ratio Price  to  rent  ratio  is  a  vital 
component  of  mortgage  lending  decisions.  It  is  used  to  assess  whether  housing  is 
within reach of the average buyer or not. If it rises over its long-term average, it 
could be an indication that prices are overlooked (OECD Economic Outlook, 2005, 
p.198). For Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, UK, Australia and New Zealand, these ratios 
exceed their long-term averages by 40% or more. In Canada, Denmark, France and 
the US, this run-up is more moderate. Affordability ratio Affordability ratio Affordability ratio Affordability ratio is another one of these 
indicators. The price to income ratio is the basic affordability measure for housing in 
a given area. It is generally the ratio of median house prices to median disposable 
incomes of the households, expressed as a percentage of annual income.   
 
On  Table  4  and  5,  we  present  the  price  to  rent  ratio  for  the  Ankara  real  estate 
market. The peak of that ratio was in the beginning of 2002 with 20.7, when all rent 
prices were depressed. As of June 2005, we observe a moderation of the ratio to an 
average of 18. On Table 6 we present a comparison of growth in affordability ratios in 
the  world.  In  Turkey,  this  ratio  has  grown  only  as  much  as  the  world  average. 
Interestingly, excluding the negative numbers on the table, Turkey falls well below 
world average.  
 
Given the analysis of real price increase and price to rent ratios it is hard to claim a 
price bubble in the real estate market. What we observed so far is only a recovery 
from a financial crisis. However, we have to remind that such a discussion would be 
relevant in the medium term if current trends continue.   11
 
4.  4.  4.  4. Bank Credits and Affordability of Real  Bank Credits and Affordability of Real  Bank Credits and Affordability of Real  Bank Credits and Affordability of Real Estate Estate Estate Estate       
 
Acquired macroeconomic stability with increased capital inflows, with sizable long-
term capital inflows, especially in the banking sector, began to flourish Turkish credit 
markets. In the past year, foreign investors began to purchase a significant stake in 
private banks. 25.5 percent of Garanti Bank was sold to GE Financial, 89.3 percent 
of Disbank was acquired by Fortis, and Bank Paribas’ share on Turkish Ekonomi 
Bank has increased to 42.1.  
 
Declining nominal interest rates changed portfolio allocations of private banks. There 
is a significant shift from investment in government bonds to credit, especially to 
consumer  credits.  Consumer  and  commercial  credits  shares  increased  in  total 
deposits.  Moreover,  with  increasing  diversification  of  loans,  the  share  of  credit 
defaults declined from 11.4 to 4.7 percent (Table 1). . . .
16 16 16 16       The restructuring of public 
banks  in  the  post  crisis  was  mainly  through  recapitalization  of  these  banks  with 
government bonds. The total bale — out reached to 20 billion US dollars (Kaplan, 
2004).  However,  even  when  it  is  controlled,  declining  trend  in  the  share  of 
government  bonds  in  banks  balance  sheets  continued.  We  observe  around  a  10 
percent decline in the 2003 — 2005 period (Table 1). Nevertheless, the credit base 
increased by more than 15 percent.  
 
The  expansion  of  credit  is also  due  to  the severe  banking  competition  in lending 
excess funds to real estate. Currently, bank competition is aggressive in the financing 
                                                
16 We cannot neglect that a part of the improvement should be attributed to the favorable economic 
conditions   12
of  housing  purchases  even  in  the  pricing  of  credit  between  domestic  and  foreign 
banks.  Average  cost  of  acquiring  demand  deposits  is  around  20.4  percent.  When 
domestic banks credit interest rate offers are higher than 24 percent, foreign banks’ 
are on average 17.2 percent (Table 2).  
 
As discussed earlier, the convergence process induces capital inflows that forced a real 
appreciation of Turkish Lira against US dollars. Moreover, the cost of long — term 
credit  in  foreign  currency  terms  is  lower  than domestic  currency.  In  this  respect, 
foreign  banks  may  be  financing  their  credit  base  through  foreign  borrowing.  The 
implication of this type of behavior will be reflected in the foreign exchange (Fx) 
short positions of the banking sector. We observe that the growth rate of Fx short 
position  of  foreign  banks’  is  higher  than  domestic  banks’.  Of  course,  this  is  also 
conditional on the possibility that Fx liabilities are not hedged. We require further 
analysis to justify these points and relegate it for future versions of the paper.   
 
In the short — run banks can offer lower financing rates for real estate credits, and 
this  return  is  lower  than  the  cost  of  acquiring  deposits.  The  motivation  is  the 
expectation for medium to longer — term profits to cover short terms losses. The 
maturity mismatch does not constitute a problem if banks possess enough capital to 
cover these losses.
17 The average maturity of time deposits is three months and real 
estate credits are almost five years. Since the lending is for longer term, with an 
expected decline in interest rates in deposits, banks can write down profits in the 
medium-term. However, this is conditional on the inability to refinance the high cost 
of credit with the low cost one. This is especially evident in substituting away from 
                                                
17 This is true if long — term credits are not financed with long-term foreign currency debt. If this is 
the case then this brings front unhedged exchange rate risks.   13
credit card debt to consumer credits. This in turn establishes higher risks for the 
banking  sector.  A  small  financial  turmoil  may  lead  to  devastating  results  if  the 
maturity mismatch is not well governed. 
 
We still have the question of affordability in our hands. Given that credit market 
conditions are favorable, consumers are able to finance their house purchase easily 
and motivate a discussion about credit boom and asset price bubbles. In this regard 
we take a step in explaining affordable housing through a representative consumers 
budget constraint. We want to identify the purchasing power of borrowers (lifetime 
wages and stock of assets) given credit supply, cost of credit on optimal maturity and 
the prices of real estate. These four variables simply constitute the lifetime budget 
constraint of an individual.  
 
  (1 )* C r B W S + + ≤ +   (1) 
 
In this equation C represents lifetime consumption, W is the lifetime earnings, B is 
the borrowed amount and r is the cost of the loan and S as the lifetime savings in 
terms of financial or real estate wealth. The model is of no borrowing constraints and 
the  individual  can  borrow  the  value  of  the  house  after  subtracting  accumulated 
savings. We also assume away the bequest motive that would indicate that borrowing 
is  spent  before  the  individual  dies.  These  assumptions  will  be  sufficient  for  the 
constraint to be satisfied with equality over an individual lifetime. 
 
Let’s assume that our representative individual accumulates assets until time t=T 
which we define by ST and spends this amount on the purchase of a real estate along   14
with a loan from the bank to cover the rest of the house value. The nature of ST 
changes from intangible assets to tangible asset after the purchase. We assume that 
borrower acquires a constant payment obligation to the bank, which we define as α . 
Given α  and ST, we can define period budget constraint of an individual as follows. 
 
  t t t S c ω α + ≥ +   (2) 
 
ω   and  c  are  the  period  earnings
18  and  consumption,  respectively.  We  can  relate 
equations (1) and (2) by α  since it is a function of gross repayments of the loan. To 
make use of our simplifying assumption of constant payments for a given maturity m, 
α  can be written as follows. 
 
 




=   (3) 
 
We use equation (3) to simulate the principal and interest payment components of 
α . We are searching for the value of interest payments, given maturity and interest 
rates, that will motivate the borrower to stop borrowing beyond their affordability 
threshold, which is defined by the total of accumulated savings, consumption, and 
period earnings. We display the surface of principal plus interest payments in Graph 
3.
19 To do this we take a fixed maturity and vary interest rates to come up with a 
constant  stream  of  payments  for  the  loan  contract  B .  If  we  do  this  for  various 
maturity dates, i.e. from one to 30 years, we can come up with a payment surface. 
                                                
18 What we mean by period earnings is the GDP per capita, earnings include all wage income and rent 
income i.e. profit shares, return to savings etc. 
19 We only consider constant payment schedules.   15
We also depict the interest payment schedule that determines the curvature of the 
payment schedule.  
 
We can now calibrate the affordable payment schedule for a real estate purchase. In 
this respect, we require the saving stock of the individual that is calculated through 
real and financial wealth, the consumption per capita, and the period earnings to 
form the upper bound for constant payment stream.
20 To be consistent we convert all 
the variables to annual figures.  
 
Notice that we have a representative individual therefore all calculations are based on 
the median consumer and done on a per capita basis. We use the current prices taken 
at the end — of — 2005. The saving per capital is simply calculated by assuming that 
the total capital stock of Turkey is equal to the total Savings. Our capital stock is 
obtained from Saygili, Cihan and Yurtoglu (2001) covering up to the year 2004. The 
2005 figures of capital stock and GDP are simply forecasted by aggregating the 2004 
values through an investment deflator. Our population figures are also accumulated 
to 2005 by assuming a 1.5 percent population growth.  
 
The numbers that we use for calculations are presented on Table 7. We assume that 
average household is consisting of four persons. The total available household income 
for credit repayments is equal to 10,300 YTL. This is calculated as the difference 
between  per capita  income  and per capita consumption multiplied by four people 
(10,300=(6,701-4,126)  x  4)  serves  as  the  upper  bound  for  annual  payments  of  a 
house.  The  total  of  saving  stock  and  financial  wealth  per  capita  is  20,201  (=per 
                                                
20 Financial wealth is calculated as the sum of stock market wealth and broad money. We used M3 definition of 
the broad money.   16
capita  capital  stock  (14,664)  +  per  capita  financial  wealth  (5,537)).  Therefore,  a 
household can put 80,804 YTL as a down payment, which is the maximum that can 
be put forward on the purchase of a house. From Table 4, we obtain the average 
home  price,  which  is  130,000  YTL.  Households  would  require  a  loan  for 
approximately  50,000  YTL  to  cover  the  difference  between  their  savings  and  the 
value  of  the  house.  At  an  annual  interest  rate  of  18.2  percent  (compound  of  1.4 
percent monthly) and average maturity in the 4.8 years level, annual payments for a 
50,000  YTL  loan  is  14,700  YTL.  This  payment  schedule  is  not  affordable  for  an 
average household.  
 
Another exercise is to ask the question from an interest rate perspective. What would 
be  the  required  reduction  in  interest  rates  in  order  to  afford  an  average  home? 
Conditional on a loan for a 30-year maturity, we make similar calculations. Results 
indicate that monthly interest rates must be around 1 percent (12.7 percent annual).  
 
In light of these results we can claim that a representative individual in our economy 
will not be able to purchase an average home. What we currently observe in the 
credit markets is the following; it is likely that the people at the upper quartiles of 
the income distribution are the ones who are purchasing the real estate and most 
likely this is done with investment motivation. This argument is consistent with the 
share  of  real  estate  credits  in  GNP.  The  current  level  is  only  2.5  percent 
corresponding to the higher income groups’ share in the population.  
         17
5. Identifying Wealth Effects 5. Identifying Wealth Effects 5. Identifying Wealth Effects 5. Identifying Wealth Effects       
 
Economic implication of changes in housing prices might reflect the key role that 
housing play in societies (Terrones, 2004). In industrial countries real estate is seen as 
the main asset in household wealth. Large house price movements affect household’s 
net  wealth,  capacity  to  borrow  and  spend  to  a  great  extent.
21  The  main  channel 
through  which  housing  cycles  affect  economic  activity  is  via  wealth  effect  on 
consumption  -  a  gain  in  real  estate  prices  induces  a  higher  rate  of  household 
consumption (World Economic Outlook, 2002). The strength of the aggregate wealth 
effect  also  depends  on  several  other  factors  such  as  homeownership  rates, 
expectations,  preferences,  transaction  costs,  and  housing  taxes  and subsidies. In a 
number of countries, including Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, the UK, and the 
US, changes in housing wealth have a significant effect on consumption where as in 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Spain, the housing wealth effects appears to be 
smaller or insignificant (OECD Economic Outlook, 2005, p.215). 
 
For  household  owners,  the  channels  for  housing  prices  to  affect  household 
consumption through wealth effect are twofold; a realized wealth effect realized wealth effect realized wealth effect realized wealth effect (direct effect) 
where households finance their consumption through refinancing through colletarizing 
the capital gain incurred in the value of the house, and unrealized wealth effect unrealized wealth effect unrealized wealth effect unrealized wealth effect, in 
which the increase in consumption is as a result of expected increase in the lifetime 
wealth. In the latter households do not refinance or sell the house. For those who rent 
                                                
21 The dimension of saving behavior is examined by Englehardt (1996). His study, on house prices and 
homeowner  saving  behavior,  explores  the  empirical  link  between  house  price  appreciation  and  the 
savings behavior of homeowners during the 1980’s. According to this study, households that experience 
real gains do not change their saving behavior. Real housing capital gains results in a decline in non-
housing  savings  and  substitute  directly  for  the  non-housing  wealth  in  financing  retirement 
consumption.   18
the house, the budget constraint effect will kick in; an increase in the value of the 
house  will  be  reflected  in  higher  rents.  Given  that  housing  is  an  imperfectly 
substitutable commodity the household consumption will decrease. The fourth effect 
that can be addressed here is the access to credit. A well functioning credit market is 
necessary for the households to enjoy the full impact of wealth effects. 
 
There are two perspectives regarding the impact of rising house prices on private 
consumption.  One  perspective  suggests  that  rising  asset  prices  might  hint  future 
output growth and therefore increases private consumption (Morck et al (1990), and 
Poterba  and  Samwick  (1995)).  The  second  perspective  describes  the  real  wealth 
effect, namely an increase in asset prices results in higher household consumption.  
 
Ludvig and Sløk (2002) study the extension of the life cycle model of consumption to 
study the real wealth effect. They describe wealth as financial and non-financial. To 
proxy former, they use the stock market wealth and for the latter they use real estate 
wealth. Their consumption function consists of log of private per capita consumption, 
disposable income and housing and stock market wealth. The short run relationship 
is described with the first lag of each explanatory variable: two wealth measures. The 
impact of these two sorts of wealth is dependent on the permanent and transitory 
components  as  well  as  the  associated  risks  with  them.  They  find  positive  wealth 
effects and conclude that consumption reacts stronger to changes in stock market 
wealth than to changes in housing wealth.  
   19
Housing  prices  are  generally  used  as  a  proxy  for  housing  wealth.
22  Although, our 
dataset includes house prices it does not extend to before the year 2000, it is not 
available in higher frequencies and its coverage is limited to Ankara. We still have to 
find a variable that is consistent with consumption data, disposable income and stock 
market wealth. We choose to use Rent Price Index (RPI) that is published by the 
Turkey’s Statistics Institution (TurkStat) to serve this purpose.  
 
Before we move to the dataset we have to explore whether the predictions of the 
earlier dataset are consistent with RPI. To motivate that, we present the plot of the 
rent and price data and the RPI on Graph 4.
23  We normalized RPI with the year 
2000  rent  prices  from  our  dataset.  A  close  look  at  the  graph  indicates  the  co-
movement between these variables. The degree of correlation coefficient between two 
rent data is 0.59.
24 RPI is always below the rent prices over this period, therefore the 
results of the regressions would be more conservative. The second justification that 
we have to make is whether rent prices can be used as a proxy for housing prices. We 
provide two sets of justification, the first is the correlation between the housing and 
rent prices in our dataset, the correlation coefficient is ranging from 0.74 to 0.84 
(Table  8).  The  second  justification  is  the  correlation  coefficient  between  housing 
                                                
22 There are studies that compute the aggregate value of the owner-occupied housing by price indices, 
home ownership rates, and the total number of households in a country. However, they also point that 
house prices serve as a good proxy for real estate wealth. 
23 The increase in rents is governed by the legislation through tying the increase in the rents as a 
function of the Consumer price inflation and the Treasury bond return for the existing tenants. The 
current  law  indicates  that  the  lease  contracts  must  be  made  on  a  three-year term.  Therefore,  the 
increase in real estate prices may not be fully reflected in the RPI. 
24  We  have  annual  data  for  2000  —  2004  and  two  quarterly  data  for  the  year  2005.  Getting  a 
correlation coefficient of 0.59 presents a strong relationship with only six degrees of freedom. Moreover, 
this relationship is searched in the percentage change of the two rent variables.    20
prices in our dataset and the RPI, the correlation is 0.2.
25 Therefore, we can conclude 
that RPI will serve as a good proxy in identifying real estate wealth effect.
26  
 
At this stage of the paper such a shift is necessary in order to have a consistent 
regression relationship between the consumption data and RPI to proxy for wealth 
effects. Our data set, although powerful to describe the average price variation in 
Turkey, lacks comprehensiveness. Moreover, in order to talk about long-run wealth 
effects we need to have a longer span of data with enough frequency to explain higher 
order relationship.  
 
The analysis covers Turkey for the 1990 — 2005 period in quarterly frequency. To 
proxy real estate wealth we use the percentage change in RPI (REW), for financial 
wealth, we use the quarterly return on Istanbul Stock Exchange 100 Index (SMW). 
Disposable  Income  (YD)  is  calculated  by  the  National  Income  Accounting 
methodology,  derived  from  GNP.  Consumption  (C)  data  exclude  expenditures  on 
rent.  We  de-seasonalize  consumption,  disposable  income  and  RPI  data  with 
Tramo/Seats. Lastly, we employ two dummy variables to control for the 1994 and 
2001 financial crises.  
 
Instead of using YD as a control variable we use it to normalize consumption. We 
rely on the lifecycle hypothesis to motivate our regressions. The general specification 
is the extension of the life cycle model of consumption as given in equation (4). We 
                                                
25  This  is  the  correlation  coefficient  of  percentage  change  in  the  variable  to  avoid  the  capture  of  trend 
movements. 
26  We acknowledge that both rent price index and Ankara price index are driven by a third factor to results in a 
high correlation between the two.     21
try  alternative  variations  of  this  regression  by  placing  restrictions  on  the  model 
parameters.  
 
  ( ) t t t t t
t
C
cons β REW γ SMW D D error
YD
* * 94 01 = + + + + +   (4) 
 
We  deviate from  the literature  to  look  for  evidence  in  the subcomponents of the 
consumption.  In  this  respect,  the  numerator  C  is  a  short  hand  to  write  total 
consumption  expenditures  ©(CT),  consumption  in  durables  (CD),  consumption  in 
semi — durables (CSD) and consumption of services (CS). The presence of wealth 
effects  is  simply  0 β ≥   and  0 γ ≥ .  However,  consumption  in  durables  is  also  an 
investment in assets that imperfectly substitutes housing. An increase in the value of 
the houses will increase the demand for durable goods consumptions
27, i.e. household 
furniture.  In  this  respect  although  income  effects  motivate  higher  consumption  of 
durables, the increase in the prices of these goods will have a substitution effect. 
Whichever dominates would drive the sign of the coefficient  β . For semi — durable 
and  services  consumption  we  would  predict  that  income  effect  dominates.  Higher 
wealth would induce people to increase the consumption of these commodities. 
 
Results are presented on Table’s 8a,b. Except consumption in durables we observe a 
positive impact of real estate wealth on consumption with parameters raging from 
slightly  above zero to 0.2 percent; a percent increase in real estate wealth would 
increase total consumption as a percentage of disposable income by 0.2 percent. The 
lowest  impact  is  seen  with  consumption  in  services,  which  is  surprising.  The 
predictive power of the regression is the highest for consumption in durables with 
                                                
27 We observe that car sales do increase in asset price booms.   22
dummy variables (Table 9a). When we look at the impact of financial wealth on 
consumption in durables we observe that it is insignificant and is dominated by real 
estate  wealth.  This  is  contrary  to  the  predictions  of  Ludvig and  Sløk (2002) and 
inline with Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2001). 
 
We believe that wealth effect has become more important over time and with the 
scheduled introduction of mortgage law we would observe a liquidity expansion with 
lower credit costs. In most OECD countries, the real estate wealth effect functions 
through the refinancing of loans due to decline in mortgage rates (OECD Economic 
Outlook, 2000). We want to stress the importance of access to credit. Ludvig and 
Sløk  (2002)  found  that  the  estimated  housing  price  elasticity  for  the  bank-based 
economies is insignificant and also lower than the significant estimate of the market-
based  economies, which  depicts the  impact of financial  system  on housing wealth 
effect.  
 
The results should be looked at with caution since we made significant restrictions on 
the model and variables. It is the sign rather than the magnitude that we stress here 
and restate the positive correlation between housing wealth and consumption. The 
credit markets are arguably shallow and the economy has been hit by severe financial 
crisis,  all  these  limit  the  scope  of  the  estimated  parameters.  Moreover,  the 
homeownership ratio in Turkey is around 72 percent (Table 10). Therefore, if wealth 
effect exists, which is mostly based on expected increase in lifetime wealth, it only 
applies to the share of the homeowner population since second mortgage is virtually 
impossible to obtain.    23
       
6. Conclusion and Directions for Future Resea 6. Conclusion and Directions for Future Resea 6. Conclusion and Directions for Future Resea 6. Conclusion and Directions for Future Research rch rch rch       
Turkey’s real estate market is growing with speed. After opening up for free trade 
and capital flows, Turkey experienced two significant financial crises, 1994 and 2001, 
emerging due to domestic factors and financial stress due to the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997 — 1998. Propagation of shocks restricted the growth rate of the economy, 
which is required to sustain growth in the real estate market. However, recent pick 
up brought concerns of real estate price bubble and credit boom. Moreover, in an 
environment where credit markets are expanding, and there is a continuous growth in 
new financial instruments, i.e. mortgage, wealth effects emerge.  
 
We  circled  our  answers  on  these  questions  and  provided  a  discussion  on  wealth 
effects.  Our  results  point  out  that  as  opposed  to  many  beliefs,  we  do  not  find 
evidence towards a real estate price bubble in Turkey. Moreover, we point out that 
the prices have not recovered to the year 2000 levels in real terms. To achieve this 
result we employed consumer price discounting, an analysis for price — rent ratios, 
which is later used to address issues about price bubbles, and provided simulations 
for affordability of housing.  
 
Price to rent ratio on average is around 18 for Turkey in the recent past, which is 
below the world average. Also, as compared to global real estate trends this ratio 
grew even slower. Our simulations point out that average income individuals are not 
able to purchase average homes in Turkey given current maturity and nominal cost 
of home credits. Those who can enter into a loan contract must be on the upper   24
quartiles  of  the  income  distribution  however  a  discussion  of  that  is  relegated  to 
further research. 
 
We observe an accelerated growth in credit numbers for Turkey; however, the share 
of real estate credits is only a small fraction, 2.5 percent of GNP and 10 percent of 
total credit base. The current level of credit is also below the level achieved in the 
year 2000. Despite accelerated growth in credit base, we still have time to discuss 
credit booms and financial fragility. However, we address the duality in the financial 
markets. The competition for the domestic credit market is motivating foreign banks 
to write off short — term losses in return for longer-term gains since they are locked in 
the downside of the deposit and credit rates, unless they provide financing through 
longer-term foreign credit. In the former case, we observe a maturity mismatch and 
in the latter they must be exposed to exchange rate risks. Domestic banks, on the 
other hand, are mostly exposed to maturity mismatch and they can make profits out 
of real estate credits even in the short — run.  
 
Our  last  argument  is  the  presence  of  wealth  effects.  We  observe  positive  and 
significant wealth effects in Turkey. We also search for the wealth effects in sub-
components of consumption. We can document positive impact of higher real estate 
wealth in all components of consumption but not on durable goods consumption.  
 
One has to note that this is the first comprehensive study on real estate markets in 
Turkey, which will motivate our research on the topic. Moreover, the identification of 
the stance of the market gives us a strong foundation to make robust predictions for 
the near future of this market. Further increases in the credit base will also motivate   25
discussions about financial fragility. Nevertheless, with further deepening of financial 
markets we will also observe the strong presence of wealth effects.  
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Table  Table  Table  Table 1 1 1 1 
Changes in the Balance Sheets of the Banking Sector (%) Changes in the Balance Sheets of the Banking Sector (%) Changes in the Balance Sheets of the Banking Sector (%) Changes in the Balance Sheets of the Banking Sector (%)       
       
  2003  2004  2005* 
Total Credit / Total Deposits   48.2  54.4  63.8 
Total Govt. Bonds / Deposits   66.3  62.5  56.7 
Loans Under Follow - Up / Total Credit   11.4  5.7  4.7 
Loans from Foreign Banks / Total Deposits   11.0  12.5  16.7 
Total Deposits / Total Assets  40.7  44.1  48.7 




Table Table Table Table 2 2 2 2 
Real Estate Credits  Real Estate Credits  Real Estate Credits  Real Estate Credits — — — — Turkey (%)  Turkey (%)  Turkey (%)  Turkey (%)       
 
  2003  2004  2005 
Over GNP  0.2  0.7  2.5 
Total Credit  1.8  3.5  10.2 
Interest Rates (Public Banks)  42.9  34.0  26.8 
Interest Rates (Private Banks)  36.0  27.9  24.1 
Interest Rates (Foreign Banks)  26.8  21.1  17.2 
Interest Rates (Investment Banks)  24.4  29.5  25.0 
Maturity (Months)  32.8  33.4  58.8 
Interest Rates (Demand Deposits)  28.0  22.8  20.4 
  Source: The Central Bank of Turkey, and Authors’ own calculations 




COUNTIES COVERED IN THE DATA SET COUNTIES COVERED IN THE DATA SET COUNTIES COVERED IN THE DATA SET COUNTIES COVERED IN THE DATA SET       
 
A.AYRANCI  ÇANKAYA  KAVAKLIDERE  SIHHIYE 
AYDINLIKEVLER  ÇAYYOLU  KEÇIÖREN  TANDOGAN 
BAGLAR CAD.  ÇUKURCA  KIZILAY  ÜMITKÖY 
BAHÇELIEVLER  DIKMEN  KONUTKENT  YENIMAHALLE 
BALGAT  ELVANKENT  KÜÇÜKESAT  YILDIZ 
BATIKENT  EMEK  MESRUTIYET CAD.  Y.AYRANCI 
BEYSUKENT  ERYAMAN  NENEHATUNCAD.   
BILKENT  GAZIOSMANPASA  ORAN   
B.ESAT  KARUM  RESIT GALIP CAD.   
                                                
28 http://www.bddk.org.tr/turkce/yayinlarveraporlar/gunluk/gunluk/gunlukrapor.htm   29
Table  Table  Table  Table 4 4 4 4       
Average Real Estate Prices and Rents  Average Real Estate Prices and Rents  Average Real Estate Prices and Rents  Average Real Estate Prices and Rents        
(Ankara, YTL) (Ankara, YTL) (Ankara, YTL) (Ankara, YTL)       
 
       
Sale Price Sale Price Sale Price Sale Price       
Real % Real % Real % Real %       
Growth Growth Growth Growth
2       
Rent Rent Rent Rent       
Per month Per month Per month Per month       
Real %  Real %  Real %  Real % 
Growth Growth Growth Growth       
Price/Rent Price/Rent Price/Rent Price/Rent
3       
       
2000 — Jan  39,652 
(16,605)
1 




2001 — Jan  60,940 
(37,847)  7 
322 
(189)  -1  15.7 
2002 — Jan  87,411 
(39,148)  -12 
367 
(148)  -34  20.7 
2003 — Jan  76,136 
(27,122)  -31 
357 
(106)  -23  17.8 
2004 — Jan  86,742 
(31,027)  -2 
487 
(224)  18  14.8 
2005 — Jan  113,514 
(35,661)  20 
540 
(142)  1  17.5 
2005 — Feb  116,447 
(39,304) 




2005 — Mar  124,211 
(44,974) 




2005 — Apr  122,898 
(47,114) 




2005 — May  131,515 
(41,283) 




2005 — Jun  129,231 
(41,393) 




Real Increase Real Increase Real Increase Real Increase
4          -14.8    -35.1   
1 Figures in parenthesis are standard deviation. 
2 Discounted with 1994 based CPI. 
3 Sale price to annual rent ratio. 
4 The total of net growth for the years 2000 — 2004. 
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Table 5 Table 5 Table 5 Table 5       
Average Real Estate Prices and Rents  Average Real Estate Prices and Rents  Average Real Estate Prices and Rents  Average Real Estate Prices and Rents        
(Ankara, US Dollars) (Ankara, US Dollars) (Ankara, US Dollars) (Ankara, US Dollars)       
 
       
Sale Price Sale Price Sale Price Sale Price       
Nominal  Nominal  Nominal  Nominal 
%  %  %  % 
Growth Growth Growth Growth       
Rent Rent Rent Rent       
Per month Per month Per month Per month       
Nominal  Nominal  Nominal  Nominal 
%  %  %  % 
Growth Growth Growth Growth       
Price/Rent Price/Rent Price/Rent Price/Rent
2       
       
2000 — Jan  70,702 
(28586)
1 




2001 — Jan  89,658 
(55,683)  27 
474 
(239)  11  15.7 
2002 — Jan  66,042 
(28,488)  -26 
280 
(113)  -44  20.7 
2003 — Jan  46,328 
(16,503)  -30 
217 
(65)  -18  17.8 
2004 — Jan  64,567 
(23,095)  39 
363 
(167)  67  14.8 
2005 — Jan  84,972 
(26,694)  32 
404 
(106)  11  17.5 
2005 — Feb  90,642 
(30,594) 




2005 — Mar  91,824 
(33,248) 




2005 — Apr  88,346 
(33,868) 




2005 — May  96,596 
(30,322) 




2005 — Jun  96,434 
(30,888) 




Nominal  Nominal  Nominal  Nominal 
Increase Increase Increase Increase





1 Figures in parenthesis are standard deviation. 
2 Sale price to annual rent ratio. 
3 The total of net growth for the years 2000 — 2004.   31
Table 6 
International Comparison of Price International Comparison of Price International Comparison of Price International Comparison of Price- - - -to to to to- - - -Rent Ratio and Real Estate Credit Base Rent Ratio and Real Estate Credit Base Rent Ratio and Real Estate Credit Base Rent Ratio and Real Estate Credit Base       
 
        Mortgage Loans/ Mortgage Loans/ Mortgage Loans/ Mortgage Loans/       
GDP GDP GDP GDP       
Price Price Price Price- - - -to to to to- - - -Rent Ratio Rent Ratio Rent Ratio Rent Ratio       
Growth* Growth* Growth* Growth*       
Netherlands  99.9  11.5 
United Kingdom  63.8  45.0 
United States  63.7  20.0 
Australia  57.3  59.1 
Germany  54.3  -10.0 
Ireland  45.0  31.8 
Canada  42.8  34.3 
Spain  42.1  54.2 
Japan  36.4  -18.5 
France  24.8  35.0 
Italy  13.3  27.7 
Turkey  **2.5  26.8 
AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE        45.3 45.3 45.3 45.3        26.4 26.4 26.4 26.4       
     Source: OECD Economic Outlook, IMF World Economic Outlook,  
     Author’s own calculations. 
    * Growth rate from 2000 to 2004. 
    ** Real Estate Credits/GDP, 2005 
       
Table 7 Table 7 Table 7 Table 7 
Variables as of 2005 for Affordable Payments Variables as of 2005 for Affordable Payments Variables as of 2005 for Affordable Payments Variables as of 2005 for Affordable Payments       
       
Saving Stock        14,664       
Financial Wealth*   5,537 
Consumption per capita**        4,126       
GDP per capita        6,701       
E(α ), YTL Upper bound        10,300       
Real Estate Credit Maturity 
(years)***       
4.8       
Interest Rate (%)****        18.2       
Maturity and interest rate 
consistent with upper bound 
30 years, 12.1 
E(α ), YTL, 4.8 years maturity  14,700 
    * Stock Market Wealth + M3 
    ** We exclude the rent payments by assuming that the purchased  
    house is used for owner occupancy. 
    *** In a speech given by Ersin Ozince, Nov 17, Istanbul 
    **** Average of all banks (annual compound)    32
Table 8 Table 8 Table 8 Table 8       
Correlation between Real Estate Prices and Rents Correlation between Real Estate Prices and Rents Correlation between Real Estate Prices and Rents Correlation between Real Estate Prices and Rents       
(Ankara, 32 Districts) (Ankara, 32 Districts) (Ankara, 32 Districts) (Ankara, 32 Districts)       
 
  (Re ,Pr ) Corr nt ice  
2000 — Jan  0.84 
(0.10) 
2001 — Jan  0.39 
(0.16) 
2002 — Jan  0.84 
(0.09) 
2003 — Jan  0.82 
(0.10) 
2004 — Jan  0.74 
(0.12) 
2005 — Jan  0.78 
(0.11) 
2005 — Feb  0.81 
(0.10) 
2005 — Mar  0.84 
(0.09) 
2005 — Apr  0.74 
(0.11) 
2005 — May  0.85 
(0.09) 
2005 — Jun  0.87 
(0.08) 
        * Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations.   33
Table 9a Table 9a Table 9a Table 9a 
Real Estate and Stock Market Wealth Effect o Real Estate and Stock Market Wealth Effect o Real Estate and Stock Market Wealth Effect o Real Estate and Stock Market Wealth Effect on Consumption n Consumption n Consumption n Consumption       
Sample 1990Q1  Sample 1990Q1  Sample 1990Q1  Sample 1990Q1 — — — — 2005Q5  2005Q5  2005Q5  2005Q5 
 
  (CT/YD)t  (CD/YD)t  (CSD/YD)t  (CS/YD)t 
























R2  0.17  0.39  0.27  0.02 
# of obs.  63  63  63  63 
    Seasonally adjusted series tramo/seats 
       * indicates significance at 1 percent. 
       
Table 9b Table 9b Table 9b Table 9b       
Real Estate and Stock Market Wealth Real Estate and Stock Market Wealth Real Estate and Stock Market Wealth Real Estate and Stock Market Wealth Effect on Consumption  Effect on Consumption  Effect on Consumption  Effect on Consumption       
Sample 1990Q1  Sample 1990Q1  Sample 1990Q1  Sample 1990Q1 — — — — 2005Q5  2005Q5  2005Q5  2005Q5       
(inclusive of crises dummies) (inclusive of crises dummies) (inclusive of crises dummies) (inclusive of crises dummies)       
 
  (CT/YD)t  (CD/YD)t  (CSD/YD)t  (CS/YD)t 








































R2  0.21  0.45  0.30  0.12 
# of obs.  63  63  63  63 
    Seasonally adjusted series tramo/seats 
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Table 10 Table 10 Table 10 Table 10 
Home Ownership Home Ownership Home Ownership Home Ownership       
Percentage of Population* Percentage of Population* Percentage of Population* Percentage of Population* 
 
TURKEY  71.95 
US  43.60 
GERMANY  56.22 
ITALY  80.00 
SPAIN  82.90 
NETHERLANDS  53.00 
IRELAND  76.92 
JAPAN  79.26 
UK  70.00 
CANADA  65.20 
AUSTRALIA  70.00 
* Total of Urban and Rural 
Source: Terrones, M, (2004), “Three Current Policy Issues”  
World Economic Outlook, IMF. pp. 71-89 and TURKIYE ISTATISTIK YILLIGI,  
2004, P.369   35
  
Graph 1 Graph 1 Graph 1 Graph 1       
 
From Government Bonds to Loans  From Government Bonds to Loans  From Government Bonds to Loans  From Government Bonds to Loans 
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Government Securities/T. Assets Gross Loans/T. Assets
 
Source: Kaplan, Ozmen and Yalcin (2006) 
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Graph 2 Graph 2 Graph 2 Graph 2       
 
Sale Prices in 32 Districts of Ankara  Sale Prices in 32 Districts of Ankara  Sale Prices in 32 Districts of Ankara  Sale Prices in 32 Districts of Ankara 
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Rent Prices in 32 Districts of Ankara  Rent Prices in 32 Districts of Ankara  Rent Prices in 32 Districts of Ankara  Rent Prices in 32 Districts of Ankara 
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Graph 3 Graph 3 Graph 3 Graph 3       
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Graph 4 Graph 4 Graph 4 Graph 4       
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